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CASE NOTES
Criminal Law-ACCEPING THE GUILTY PLEA-State v. Goulette, 258
N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1977).
Plea bargaining has been recognized officially by the Minnesota Su-
preme Court since 1968.' An integral part of our criminal justice system,
2
plea bargaining offers benefits both to the accused and to the state.3 By
pleading guilty to a reduced charge, a criminal defendant avoids the
burden of a trial as well as the possibility that a more severe penalty
will be imposed if convicted of a greater offense.' The state benefits from
the guilty plea because prosecutors are not put to the burden of proving
the charge, and the courts, confronted with an increasing number of
criminal cases,5 are not compelled to utilize scarce judicial resources for
a full-length trial.!
1. State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 468 n.4, 160 N.W.2d 146, 149 n.4 (1968) ("[The
widely held view that plea bargaining is prohibited . . . [was] only recently rejected by
this court in State v. Johnson. ... ); see State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 214, 156
N.W.2d 218, 222 (1968) (recognizing that plea bargaining is not against public policy).
2. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("The disposition of criminal
charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called
'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration of justice."). See
generally C. JoNEs & M. PETERSON, JoNzS ON MiNNESoTA CmumNAL PRocEDURE 278-96 (4th
ed. 1974).
3. The advantages of the guilty plea were summarized by the United States Supreme
Court in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), in which the Court stated:
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of plead-
ing guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious-his exposure is re-
duced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical bur-
dens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages-. . . with
the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved
Id. at 752; accord, Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 15-16, 162 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1968).
See generally U.S. PRIWIDENT's COMMUSSION ON LAw ENFORCEM-NT AND ADMINisTRATION OF
JuSTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRiUM N A FREE Socserv 134-37 (1967).
4. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); Chapman v. State, 282 Minn.
13, 16, 162 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1968) ("From the standpoint of the defendant whose guilt of
a criminal offense is clear and provable, it is frequently better to acknowledge guilt than
to pursue a fruitless contest which may lead to a sentence more severe than that likely to
be imposed upon acceptance of the plea of guilty.").
5. For example, while 28,137 criminal cases were commenced in the federal district
courts in 1960, 39,786 criminal cases were commenced in 1977. See Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director, reprinted in BUPEAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTCAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 194 (99th ed. 1978).
In 1960, federal district courts entered final judgments for 30,512 criminal defendants;
53,188 criminal judgments were entered in 1977. See id.
6. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); Chapman v. State, 282 Minn.
13, 15-16, 162 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1968) ("From the standpoint of the state, the tender of a
guilty plea eliminates the necessity of a complex and costly criminal trial. Congested court
1
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Courts have recognized, however, that a criminal defendant's consti-
tutional rights must take priority over the interests in judicial economy.7
Thus, a standard has been established for determining when a trial
court may accept a plea of guilty. To satisfy due process, a guilty plea
must be entered voluntarily and intelligently,8 and the defendant must
have knowledge of the rights and privileges being relinquished Estab-
lishing a factual basis on thd record is one important means of showing
that this standard is satisfied.'0
When a defendant admits guilt, application of this standard presents
few problems. The standard may be difficult to apply, however, when a
defendant, while desiring to plead guilty, professes innocence. Doubt is
cast upon the voluntariness and intelligence with which the plea is
entered," and establishing a factual basis to support the plea becomes
more difficult. 2 In State v. Goulette,'" the Minnesota Supreme Court
calendars and overburdened prosecutors are relieved."); State ex rel. Welper v. Rigg, 254
Minn. 10, 16, 93 N.W.2d 198, 203-(1958) (guilty plea relieves prosecution of proving any
essential elements of the crime).
7. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) ("[I]f a defendant's guilty
plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process
..... ). Both the United States Supreme Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court have
recognized the guilty plea as an essential component of the administration of justice that
must be attended by safeguards to ensure protection of the defendant's rights. See Santo-
bello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-62 (1971); State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 214-15,
156 N.W.2d 218, 222-23 (1968). See generally H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THa CouRT 3-7
(2d ed. 1972) (criminal justice must balance individual rights with the community's
interest in an effective criminal justice system).
The criminal defendant who pleads guilty is still entitled to due process under the
Constitution. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The fifth amendment
provides: "No person shall . . .be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment explicitly re-
quires the states to observe this maxim by declaring that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 466 (1969); State v. Casarez, 295 Minn. 534, 536, 203 N.W.2d 406, 408 (1973)
(per curiam); State v. Jones, 267 Minn. 421, 427, 127 N.W.2d 153, 157 (1964); cf. State v.
Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Minn. 1978) ("The primary responsibility of the court
when a plea of guilty is made is to ensure that the plea was not coerced ....").
9. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 & n.6 (1970); Kercheval v. United
States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927); State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Minn. 1978);
Coolen v. State, 288 Minn. 44, 48, 179 N.W.2d 81, 84 (1970); State v. Jones, 267 Minn.
421, 427, 127 N.W.2d 153, 157 (1964).
10. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 & n.10 (1970); McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969); State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Minn.
1978); State v. Hoaglund, 307 Minn. 322, 327, 240 N.W.2d 4, 6 (1976); State v. Taylor,
288 Minn. 37, 41-42, 178 N.W.2d 892, 895 (1970).
11. See State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Minn. 1977).
12. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 & n.10 (1970); cf. Holscher v. State,
No. 49160, slip op. at 1-2 (Minn. May 18, 1979) ("While the usual way in which the
[factual basis] requirement is satisfied is for the court to personally question defendant
[Vol. 5
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addressed the question of how a trial court should apply the standard
in such a situation.
The defendant in Goulette was indicted as an accessory to first-degree
murder, 4 an offense that carries a mandatory penalty of life imprison-
ment. 5 At the plea hearing, the defense counsel presented a summary
of the prosecution's key evidence.'" After this presentation, Goulette
entered a negotiated plea of guilty to second-degree murder." The de-
fendant denied that he intended to assist his accomplice in committing
the crime but, faced with the prosecution's strong case and the threat
of life imprisonment if convicted after a trial, maintained his plea of
guilty." The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced the defendant
to a maximum twenty-five year prison term for second-degree murder.'
Goulette appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in
accepting his guilty plea because his testimony at the plea hearing indi-
cated that he lacked the requisite intent to kill,20 an element of second-
degree murder. 21 According to the defendant, this lack of evidence of
and have defendant express in his own words what happened, there are other ways of
satisfying the requirement.").
13. 258 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1977).
14. See id. at 760. The defendant was present when his partner shot and killed their
mutual acquaintance. See id. After the shooting, Goulette assisted his partner in disposing
of the body and the car in which the victim was killed. See Appellant's Brief at 9-10. For
such participation, a person may be held criminally liable, as an accessory, for a crime
committed by another. See MwN. STAT. § 609.05 (1978).
15. Minnesota Statutes, section 609.185 provides:
Whoever does either of the following is guilty of murder in the first degree and
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life:
(1) Causes the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent
to effect the death of such person or of another; or
(2) Causes the death of a human being while committing or attempting to
commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or
violence, either upon or affecting such person or another.
MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1978).
16. 258 N.W.2d at 760. The evidence of intent, as summarized by the defense counsel,
consisted of statements by various witnesses given to the police, which indicated that
Goulette "planned to get rid of somebody" and had purchased a gun. Appellant's Brief
at 12. The defendant denied the most damaging of these statements. See id. at 13.
17. See 258 N.W.2d at 760.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. Goulette claimed that he had denied intending to aid his partner both before
and during the killing. See Appellant's Brief at 11. In light of this denial, Goulette may
have been guilty only of being an accessory after the fact. See id. at 19. An accessory after
the fact is one who aids an offender to avoid arrest, an offense independent of the original
crime which carries a maximum penalty of three years imprisonment and a fine of $3,000.
See MINN. STAT. § 609.495 (1978).
21. See MwN. STAT. § 609.19 (1978) ("Whoever causes the death of a human being with
intent to effect the death of such person or another, but without premeditation, is guilty
of murder in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
40 years." (emphasis added)).
19791
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intent meant that the conviction was not supported by a factual basis
and therefore should be reversed."
In considering whether a trial court may accept a guilty plea accom-
panied by a claim of innocence,"3 the Minnesota court looked to the
United States Supreme Court decision in North Carolina v. Alford.2" In
Alford the defendant maintained that he was innocent, claiming that
the only reason he pled guilty to second-degree murder was to avoid
the possible death sentence that he would risk if tried for first-degree
murder. 5 The Court held that federal constitutional standards were not
violated by the acceptance of the guilty plea because the plea had been
entered voluntarily and intelligently and was supported by a strong
factual basis," but noted that states were permitted to restrict the cir-
cumstances under which the state courts could accept guilty pleas."
Relying on Alford, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Goulette
that a guilty plea accompanied by a claim of innocence may be accepted
by a trial court when the factual basis shows evidence that would sup-
port a jury verdict of guilty and establishes that the plea is voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly entered." Reviewing the acceptance of
Goulette's plea, the court determined that the plea had been entered
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly, and that factual evidence
had been presented that would have supported a jury verdict of guilty
had the case gone to trial.
Although prior decisions of the Minnesota court had established that
a guilty plea may be accepted when guilt is not admitted, 3° Goulette is
22. See Appellant's Brief at 19-20.
23. Rule 15 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure is designed to assist the trial
court in accepting a plea of guilty. Essentially, the rule contains a list of questions to be
asked by the court to ascertain whether acceptance of the plea is proper and, if applied
in its entirety, makes no allowance for a guilty plea accompanied by a claim of innocence.
See MiN. R. CRim. P. 15.01. Further, the Note to rule 15.01 provides that "lilt is
desirable that the defendant also be asked to acknowledge that he has signed the Petition
to Plead Guilty, suggested form of which is contained in the appendix A," id., Note, one
paragraph of which contains the defendant's acknowledgement that no claims of inno-
cence are being made. See id. app. A(25).
24. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
25. See id. at 28.
26. See id. at 37-38.
27. See id. at 39 ("The States in their wisdom may ... by statute or otherwise...
prohibit the practice of accepting pleas to lesser included offenses under any circumstan-
ces. But this is not the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights.").
Some states do refuse to accept a guilty plea accompanied by a claim of innocence. See,
e.g., People v. Morrison, 348 Mich. 88, 91, 81 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1957) (guilty plea must
be refused when the statements of the accused are inconsistent with the plea); State v.
Reali, 26 N.J. 222, 224, 139 A.2d 300, 302 (1958) (per curiam) (guilty plea should be refused
when defendant claims to be innocent).
28. See 258 N.W.2d at 760-61.
29. See id. at 762.
30. See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 292 Minn. 453, 454, 193 N.W.2d 819, 820 (1972) (per
[Vol. 5
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the first Minnesota case to hold that a guilty plea can be accepted when
the defendant expressly claims to be innocent.3' In Goulette the court
recognized that the entry of a guilty plea, even though the defendant
professes innocence, can be the result of a rational decision, voluntarily
and intelligently made:32 by entering a guilty plea a defendant can avoid
the burden of a lengthy trial and the risk of being convicted of a greater
curiam) (guilty plea can be accepted from defendant who, because of amnesia, has no
recollection of crime or intent to commit it); State ex rel. Crossley v. Tahash, 263 Minn.
299, 308, 116 N.W.2d 666, 672 (1962) (guilty plea can be accepted from defendant who
was too intoxicated to recall events of the crime); State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 261
Minn. 106, 114, 110 N.W.2d 867, 872 (1961) (guilty plea acceptable from defendant who
cannot recall events of crime because of mere failure of memory).
31. See 258 N.W.2d at 761; cf. Pearson v. State, 308 Minn. 287, 288-89, 241 N.W.2d
490, 491 (1976) (per curiam) (appeal from guilty plea when defendant denied any criminal
intent when plea was entered; "[W]e do not believe that the trial court erred in accepting
the plea. . . . In so holding, we do not decide whether a trial court may, under extraordi-
nary circumstances, accept a defendant's guilty plea notwithstanding a defendant's
unequivocal denial of guilt." (emphasis in original)).
Adopting the rationale of Alford, the Minnesota court stated in Goulette:
Until this case, we have not been faced directly with the issue of whether to
follow the reasoning of the Alford case-that there are situations where A lford-
type pleas make sense and should be accepted. We have cited Alford in a
number of cases, but those were cases in which the defendants, while not main-
taining their innocence, did not unequivocally admit guilt ...
Facing the issue directly for the first time, we now hold that a trial court may
accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the accused protests that he
is innocent ....
258 N.W.2d at 761 (citations omitted). In an earlier case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
had intimated that a guilty plea should not be accepted when the defendant's testimony
negates an essential element of the crime. See State ex rel. Schuler v. Tahash, 278 Minn.
302, 310, 154 N.W.2d 200, 207 (1967) ("It is settled that where a defendant, upon examina-
tion by the court after plea of guilty, states facts which would negate the existence of an
essential element of the crime, a plea of guilty should not be accepted .... ") (dictum).
Thus, the Goulette decision may symbolize a retreat from the view of the court at the time
Schuler was decided. Compare id. with 258 N.W.2d at 761. Before Goulette was decided,
however, the Minnesota court had indicated the possibility that Alford might be followed.
See Pearson v. State, 308 Minn. 287, 288-89, 241 N.W.2d 490, 491 (1976) (per curiam).
32. This was implicit in the court's holding in Goulette:
[Wie now hold that a trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even
though the accused protests that he is innocent if the court, on the basis of its
interrogatories of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in
support of the plea, concludes that the evidence would support a jury verdict of
guilty, and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.
258 N.W.2d at 761.
The United States Supreme Court recognized this principle in Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970), when it declined to hold "that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid
under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the
certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities
extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the
crime charged." Id. at 751. A plea of guilty was held not to be invalid merely because it
was entered to avoid the possibility of a death sentence. See id. at 755.
1979]
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offense."3 Although a criminal defendant has no right to have the court
accept a guilty plea, 3 implicit within the Goulette decision is the main-
tenance of a defendant's opportunity to obtain the benefits of a guilty
plea. To hold otherwise could result in compelling a defendant to stand
trial even though the defendant wishes to plead guilty.
5
The decision in Goulette also recognized the advantages that accrue
to the state through plea negotiation. Because a defendant who pleads
guilty waives his constitutional right to be tried by a jury, 3' the state
need not provide a costly trial, which affords some relief to overbur-
dened prosecutors and congested court calendars and promotes thereby
the state's interest in judicial economy.37 The time saved by plea nego-
33. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
34. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) ("There is ... no absolute
right to have a guilty plea accepted."); State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn.
1977) ("Neither the constitution nor our Rules of Criminal Procedure give to a criminal
defendant an absolute right to have his plea of guilty accepted.").
35. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38-39 (1970); State ex rel. Crossley v.
Tahash, 263 Minn. 299, 308, 116 N.W.2d 666, 672 (1962).
36. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed ... " U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. The Minne-
sota Constitution also guarantees this right in all criminal cases. See MINN. CONST. art.
1, § 6. The guilty plea, because it constitutes a conviction without trial, is a waiver of this
constitutional right to a trial. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970);
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
Similarly, entry of a guilty plea is a waiver of the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination as to the crime admitted, see, e.g., id.; United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d
735, 738 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United States v. Sherman, 474
F.2d 303, 305-06 (9th Cir. 1973), and a waiver of the sixth amendment right to confront
opposing witnesses. See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
The present status of the waiver of constitutional rights under the guilty plea is ex-
pressed by the Brady trilogy, three United States Supreme Court cases decided the same
day: Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). These three cases, taken together,
make a guilty plea an absolute waiver. See Note, The Waivability by Guilty Plea of
Retroactively Endowed Constitutional Rights, 41 ALB. L. REV. 115, 120 (1977). By entering
a guilty plea, a criminal defendant waives all nonjurisdictional defects of the prior pro-
ceedings against him. See Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Spada, 331 F.2d 995, 996 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 865 (1964).
Because the guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events of the criminal process,
appellate courts will not review any deprivation of rights, other than those affecting the
voluntariness of the plea, that occurred prior to the entry of the plea. See Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
37. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. Chief Justice Burger, discussing the
federal court system, stated that, historically and statistically, the amount of judicial
manpower and facilities have been based on the premise that 90% of criminal defendants
will plead guilty, leaving only 10% to be tried. He estimated that even a small change in
the percentage rate could have a tremendous effect. For instance, a 10% reduction in guilty
pleas would require twice the judicial resources now utilized. See Burger, The State of the
Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970). In a 1975 survey in Alameda County, Cali-
fornia, it was estimated that the number of judges would have to be increased from 60 to
[Vol. 5
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tiation is significant; in Minnesota approximately ninety percent of all
criminal convictions are obtained by guilty pleas." By upholding the
validity of Goulette's guilty plea, the court intimates approval of the
state's extensive use of plea negotiation.
While the benefits offered by plea bargaining are substantial, the
resulting guilty pleas would serve little purpose if they were unsup-
ported by sufficient factual evidence. Recognizing the possibility that
an innocent defendant might be coerced into entering a negotiated
guilty plea, 39 the Goulette court emphasized the importance of estab-
lishing a sufficient factual basis when accepting a plea of guilty.40 To
ensure that the defendant is guilty of a crime at least as serious as the
one to which the defendant is pleading guilty," and to minimize thereby
the possibility of convicting an innocent person, 2 trial courts have the
critical responsibility of ascertaining whether a sufficient factual basis
for the plea exists.4 3 To establish the factual basis, the court in Goulette
450 in order to try all the cases that were disposed of by negotiated guilty pleas. See
Bechefsky & Kathov, Plea Bargaining: An Essential Component of Criminal Justice, 52
CAL. ST. B.J. 214, 279 (1977).
38. See THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
CouRTs 9 (1967) (In 1965, 91.7% of the convictions in Minnesota district courts were
obtained by pleas of guilty.); Minnesota Statistical Analysis Center, Crime Control Plan-
ning Bd., Plea Bargaining in Minnesota 104 (1979). The significance of the time saved by
guilty pleas comes from the relief given to the courts and prosecutors. See notes 6, 37 supra
and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Minn. 1978) ("The primary
responsibility of the court when a plea of guilty is made is to ensure that the plea was not
coerced .... "); Coolen v. State, 288 Minn. 44, 48, 179 N.W.2d 81, 84 (1970) ("A plea of
guilty . . . should not be accepted [when] . . . induced by misapprehension or igno-
rance."); State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 472, 160 N.W.2d 146, 151 (1968) ("Injustice
results because defendant's self-conviction [guilty plea] has been induced by a form of
official deceit or by means which are at least grossly unfair.").
40. See 258 N.W.2d at 761-62; State v. Hoaglund, 307 Minn. 322, 325, 240 N.W.2d 4, 5
(1976) (trial court has sole responsibility to establish adequate factual basis for guilty
plea); Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 L. & CONTRMP. PROB. 102,
126 (Winter 1977) (Alford indicates trial judge must do more than ask prosecutor to justify
charge; evidence establishing guilt must be shown).
41. Beaman v. State, 301 Minn. 180, 183, 221 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1974) (per curiam).
42. See Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 16, 162 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1968) ("The pur-
poses of the criminal law are not served if defendants are permitted to plead guilty to
offenses of which they are not in fact guilty.").
43. See, e.g., 258 N.W.2d at 761 ("[Wjhen an Alford-type plea is offered the trial court
should not cavalierly accept the plea but should assume its responsibility to determine
. . . whether there is a sufficient factual basis to support it."); State v. Hoaglund, 307
Minn. 322, 325, 240 N.W.2d 4, 5 (1976) ("[W]e have reversed where the trial court has
not assumed full responsibility to establish an adequate factual basis before ordering a
judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea."); State v. Taylor, 288 Minn. 37, 41-42, 178
N.W.2d 892, 895 (1970) ("It is essential, of course, that the record establish a factual basis
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suggested that the prosecutor should introduce statements of witnesses
and other items to aid the court in its determination.4 Additionally,
when appropriate, the prosecutor might call some of the state's wit-
nesses to give a shortened version of the testimony they would otherwise
give at the trial.4 The importance of the factual basis was emphasized
by the Goulette court's greater concern with the facts establishing a
defendant's guilt than with the defendant's willingness to admit it."
Guilty pleas are critically important to the administration of criminal
justice, and the Minnesota court's decision in Goulette serves both the
state's and the defendant's interests in continuing the extensive use of
negotiated pleas. Historically, the court has been reluctant to invalidate
guilty pleas, 7 emphasizing that pleas would be vacated only to correct
44. See 258 N.W.2d at 761.
45. See id. In its brief in Goulette, the state cautioned that such an approach might be
unduly burdensome:
If this Court were to require the State to bring its witnesses before a trial court
and have them subjected to cross-examination and impeachment, during the
taking of a guilty plea, it would in effect be prohibiting the type of guilty plea
permitted by the Alford decision and requiring such cases to be tried to a Judge.
Respondent's Brief and Appendix at 12. Nevertheless, witness testimony can be used at
the plea hearing to establish the factual basis. See State v. Genereux, 272 N.W.2d 33, 34
n.2 (Minn. 1978) (per curiam) ("Other important ways of establishing factual basis would
be to include written statements of witnesses as exhibits or to take testimony of certain
witnesses."); cf. Holscher v. State, No. 49160, slip op. at 1-2 (Minn. May 18, 1979) ("While
the usual way in which the [factual basis] requirement is satisfied is for the court to
personally question defendant and have defendant express in his own words what hap-
pened, there are other ways of satisfying the requirement.").
46. See 258 N.W.2d at 761. The court held:
[A] trial court may accept a plea of guilty by an accused even though the
accused protests that he is innocent if the court, on the basis of its interrogato-
ries of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the
plea, concludes that the evidence would support a jury verdict of guilty.
Id.
47. See Bishop, Guilty Pleas in the Northern Midwest, 25 DRAKE L. Rav. 360, 390 (1975)
(according to survey, Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed 177 out of 197 appeals from
convictions based on guilty pleas).
The Minnesota court's attitude toward appeals from guilty pleas and the finality of
judgment was succinctly stated in Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 162 N.W.2d 698
(1968):
[Once the plea is accepted and a judgment of conviction is entered upon it,
the general policy favoring the finality of judgments applies to some extent, at
least, in criminal as well as in civil cases. . . . While the state has no reason to
imprison a man for a crime which he did not commit, "[wie are not disposed
to encourage accused persons to 'play games' with the courts at the expense of
already overburdened calendars and the rights of other accused persons awaiting
trial" by setting aside judgments of conviction based upon pleas made with
deliberation and accepted by the court with caution.
Id. at 16, 162 N.W.2d at 700 (quoting Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979, 984 (D.C.
Cir. 1964)) (footnote omitted); see Beltowski v. State, 289 Minn. 215, 219, 183 N.W.2d
563, 566 (1971) (failure to require defendant to abide by properly accepted plea agreement
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manifest injustice.48 So long as the criminal defendant is afforded due
process and steps are taken to avoid the conviction of an innocent per-
son, the court appears to be satisfied. Convictions based on guilty pleas
will be upheld in Minnesota, provided the standards for accepting the
pleas are applied properly, within the limits established by the United
States Supreme Court in Alford.
Evidence-Remedies-Property Rights-Torts-Busch v. Busch
Construction, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
In this 1977 decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the
doctrine of curative admissibility, discussed remittiturs and the rea-
sonableness of jury verdicts, expanded the right of women to bring
actions for future medical expenses, and adopted a comparative fault
analysis in strict products liability suits.
In Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc.,I the Minnesota Supreme Court
addressed a number of significant issues that affect the law of evidence,2
damages,' married women's property rights,' and products liability.'
Busch involved six consolidated personal injury actions arising out of a
single vehicle accident. The accident victims contended that a plastic
particle broke loose from the turn signal switch prior to the accident,
causing the steering wheel to lock and the vehicle to go out of control.'
General Motors, manufacturer of the automobile, disputed the plain-
tiffs' theory of causation, maintaining that the accident resulted from
the driver falling asleep at the wheel or his inattention.' After a twelve
week trial, the jury found Lando Busch, the vehicle's driver, fifteen
percent at fault, and General Motors, on a strict liability theory, eighty-
five percent at fault.'
would have adverse effect on use of plea negotiations as an aid to effective administration
of justice); Note, supra note 36, at 123.
48. See, e.g., Coolen v. State, 288 Minn. 44, 48, 179 N.W.2d 81, 84 (1970) ("[An
application to withdraw a plea of guilty ... should be granted whenever necessary to
correct a manifest injustice."); Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 20-21, 162 N.W.2d 698,
703 (1968) ("We have refused to order vacation of a guilty plea when manifest injustice
has not been demonstrated."); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GutLTY § 2.1(b), Commentary § 2.1(b) (Approved
Draft 1968).
1. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
2. See notes 9-32 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 33-44 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 45-65 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 66-100 infra and accompanying text.
6. 262 N.W.2d at 383-84.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 383.
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